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Abstract
This paper analyzes a recent debate on regulating cyber weapons through
multilateral export controls. The background relates to the amending of the
international Wassenaar Arrangement with offensive cyber security technolo-
gies known as intrusion software. Implicitly, such software is related to previ-
ously unregulated software vulnerabilities and exploits, which also make the
ongoing debate particularly relevant. By placing the debate into a historical
context, the paper reveals interesting historical parallels, elaborates the politi-
cal background, and underlines many ambiguity problems related to rigorous
definitions for cyber weapons. Many difficult problems remaining for framing
offensive security tools with multilateral export controls are also pointed out.
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11 Introduction
In 2015 the United States (U.S.) Department of Commerce announced a proposal
for an implementation of the amendments that were made in 2013 to the interna-
tional Wassenaar Arrangement (2019) on conventional weapons and related tech-
nologies that may be used for military purposes. The proposal addressed a new
type of cyber weapons known as intrusion software, causing a vocal protest in the
multinational information and communication technology (ICT) sector in general
(Shaw, 2016), and the cyber security industry in particular (Burkart and McCourt,
2017).1 This paper sets to elaborate the debate from a historical perspective.
The rationale and relevance are easy to justify. From the beginning, Wasse-
naar was strongly motivated by and built upon the ideals of efficiency, openness,
transparency, and responsibility (Atlas, 2008; Boese, 1998; Craft and Grillot, 1999;
Micara, 2012; von der Dunk, 2009). In light of these ideals, the current debate
exemplifies many of the pressing issues that continue to plague export controls.
Adverse to the stated goals, the amendments and proposals were made without
extensive prior public discussion and debate. A discussion is required also in aca-
demic research because academic research itself may be affected. In other words,
the continuing alterations made to export controls may have important implica-
tions not only for the private sector cyber security industry but also for academic
computer science research of computer security. As has long been the case with
export controls for cryptography and science in general (Bohm et al., 1999; Evans
and Valdivia, 2012; Williams-Jones et al., 2014), cross-border research and devel-
opment, education, and the freedom of speech might all be exposed to the cyber
security policy changes and initiatives elaborated.
This paper proceeds by discussing the historical background in terms of inter-
national venues and historical ideas, ideologies, and legacies, including the the
1990s debates on export controls for cryptography. By contrasting these against
the current Wassenaar debate, the paper reveals a number of interesting historical
parallels and differences.
For framing the historical background, the paper emphasizes the concept of
discretion, which can be defined in the present context as a lack of obligatory rules
for a state to implement and enforce a transfer control in a multilateral export reg-
ulation regime covering physical goods, technology, or services. Here, the specific
term multilateral is used interchangeably with a term inter-governmental. Then: if
a level of discretion is high – as is the case with Wassenaar – the efficiency of a
given multilateral export control system depends on an agreement between the
member states on the content, comprehensiveness, diligence, and transparency of
export control lists agreed, which are, however, left for states to implement and
enforce in order to prevent a transfer of a listed item to the hands of states targeted
(Craft and Grillot, 1999).2 Due to the ideals of comprehensiveness and diligence,
there is a continuing race for export control regimes to keep up with technical in-
novations and new forms of security, which should be enumerated meticulously
for efficiency and bargaining reasons.
At the same time, the discretion principle makes implementation a national or
a regional matter, which implies that enforcement is exposed to national politics
2and policies, including economic policy. Consequently, many fundamental ana-
lytical pairs, such as freedom and security, benevolent and malevolent, and legit-
imate and illegitimate (Rath et al., 2014; Williams-Jones et al., 2014), are arguably
not enough for understanding the historical background. In many respects, the ex-
port control history regarding ICT is better read against the pairs between security
and commerce, foreign policy and trade policy, or more concretely, as an interplay
between the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce (cf. Diffie and Landau 2007;
Evans and Valdivia 2012; Hansen 2016; Seyoum 2017). This economic viewpoint
also allows to better understand the current debate and its linkages to contempo-
rary security industry practices and tools.
In addition to contributing to the scholarly research of export controls, this pa-
per participates to the ongoing discussion about the increasing pressure for reg-
ulating cyber weapons, critical infrastructure, and related context areas of con-
temporary cyber security politics. In particular, the current Wassenaar debate is
related to potential regulative elements placed upon software vulnerabilities (soft-
ware defects that expose software implementations to security weaknesses) and
exploits (software implementations that target vulnerabilities and with which tar-
get software implementations are potentially compromised). It can be noted that
neither concept is explicitly related to malware, which includes software imple-
mentations that are installed as payloads to systems that have already been com-
promised with exploits.3 The point is important from a regulative perspective.
Engineering and distributing malware – whether computer viruses or more re-
cent nuisances such as ransomware – are already criminal offenses in many national
legislations. In contrast, regulations for vulnerabilities and exploits are few and
far between, although recent regulative pressures have also transcended to schol-
arly research and policy recommendations. Even though some scholars have been
cautious to give policy recommendations (Herr and Rosenzweig, 2016; Wilson,
2013), many scholars have taken a firm stance recently in favor (Dunn Cavelty,
2014; Jardine, 2015) or against (Denning, 2015) the regulation of vulnerabilities
and exploits. This paper contributes to this discussion with a case that alarms
policy makers and stakeholders about many problems for regulation via export
controls. Based on a brief technical review, a few policy recommendations are
also pointed out.
To better understand the background, it should be emphasized that a software
vulnerability is only an abstraction for a software bug with particular importance.
Not all vulnerabilities are exploitable as such, and a concrete demonstration of the
existence of a vulnerability is best done with a proof-of-concept exploit. Although
both concepts thus generalize to common software engineering abstractions, pres-
sure to regulate these abstractions has had a more concrete manifestation, relating
to a software security industry segment that emerged in the early 2000s for trans-
acting sensitive information that vulnerabilities carry.
These transactions are related to the practices, norms, and ideals behind the
so-called vulnerability disclosure via which benign vulnerability discoverers make
their discoveries known to software vendors and the public (Buchanan, 2016b).
Although different public sector organizations have participated in vulnerability
disclosure for decades via national computer emergency response teams and re-
3lated arrangements, the recent interest of policy makers and state agencies have
focused on vulnerability and exploit marketplaces orchestrated by third-party
brokerage companies, commonplace vulnerability finding contests and campaigns
directly orchestrated by many ICT companies, and related commercial aspects
that characterize particularly the offensive security industry segment (Burkart and
McCourt, 2017; Ruohonen et al., 2016b; Wilson, 2013).4 As shall be elaborated,
however, the 2013 amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the later
implementation proposal of the U.S. Department of Commerce both contained
vagueness and ambiguity that are typical to export controls, which typically and
often inconsequentially escalate to other domains.
2 Background
The current Wassenaar debate cannot be understood without understanding the
historical background of modern expert controls. To present a concise historical
narrative, the following discussion briefly addresses the international background
and the historical genesis behind the Wassenaar Arrangement. These two facets
are used to motivate the subsequently discussed early history of cyber security
export controls.
2.1 Export Control Regimes
The Wassenaar Arrangement was initiated and signed between 1994 and 1995 as
a replacement for the agreements Western states had had against the former War-
saw Pact member states. Driven by the stated goals of preventing the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and improving transfer regulation of con-
ventional weapons, the WA was negotiated from the foundation that the the Cold
War era Coordination Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) had
left after dissolving in 1994. Akin to a famous Dutch labor market agreement in
1982, the town of Wassenaar in the Netherlands lent its name for the final resolu-
tion known as the Wassenaar Arrangement of Export Controls for Conventional
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.
The loose and debatable term dual-use refers to goods and technologies that
are primarily commercial but may be still used for significantly enhancing mili-
tary capabilities. In general, the term operates with the polar coordinates between
civilian and military (Craft and Grillot, 1999; Rath et al., 2014), although national
legislations and norms add further coordinates. Often, national questions related
to dual-use weapons are handled in specific national institutions, and these have
usually also different export requirements and licensing procedures compared to
conventional weapons and munitions (Diffie and Landau, 2007; Seyoum, 2017).
This legal, bureaucratic, and political complexity is understandable against the
often large amount of specific items covered in national and international reg-
ulations. Originally the list of multilaterally covered items ranged from tanks,
large-caliber artillery, and warships to electronics, semiconductors, lasers, and
other manufactured military hardware, but international coverage was later ex-
tended toward biological and chemical weapons, among other domains (Atlas,
42008; Shaw, 2016). Within this international and intergovernmental regulation
and coordination setup, the WA has been the most important facilitating medium
for items that fall within an all-embracing category of dual-use ICT.
The expansion of coverage was fostered by international developments. A brief
calendar of noteworthy Cold War events includes the nuclear test initiated by In-
dia in 1974, followed by the later rocket tests by India and South Korea, the chem-
ical warfare used during the Iran-Iraq war, and the late 1980s concerns of Iraq’s
state-led biological WMD programs (Micara, 2012; Shaw, 2016). These develop-
ments correlated with the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) in
1977, the Australia Group in 1985, and the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) in 1987. From these, the Australia Group has continued to provide the
premium but still informal venue for states to harmonize export controls of chem-
ical and biological weapons. Currently, the composition of the Australia Group
(see Fig. 1) is almost identical with the composition of the Wassenaar Arrangement
(see Fig. 2). Both multilateral venues have also continued to expand in the 2010s,
both in terms of member states and covered items. Even though India joined in
2017, many important countries still remain unaffiliated, however. From the four
key exceptions in the late 1990s (Boese, 1998), only South Africa has joined to the
WA as an official member; Brazil, China, and Israel remain outside.
The partial expansion of the Wassenaar Arrangement toward conventional
(non-WMD) weapons occurred already in the mid-1990s when the initial mem-
ber states agreed to avoid transferring either weapons or ammunition to parties
in the Afghanistan conflict, following the United Nations (UN) Security Council
Resolution (The Wassenaar Arrangement, 1996; The United Nations, 1996). After
slower progression during the second half of the 1990s, fears of WMD prolifera-
tion again intensified in the aftermaths of the September 11 attacks (Micara, 2012;
Williams-Jones et al., 2014). In terms of Wassenaar, the changed security land-
scape after 2001 manifested itself by an alteration to the founding document in
2002, for the first time since the WA’s initiation. Although pressing WMD pro-
liferation questions were firmly on international political agenda also in the late
2000s and early 2010s, a major international breakthrough occurred with differ-
ent kinds of weapons with the initiation of the multilateral, UN-led, Arms Trade
Treaty (ATT) program.
The focus on human rights was pronounced during the developments that
led to the ATT program (Bromley et al., 2012; Erickson, 2015). This focus also
motivated the 2013 amendments made to the WA. In particular, the initial im-
petus for the European Union (EU) and the U.S. to restrict the proliferation of
cyber weapons came with the numerous early 2010s cases that spotlighted the op-
pressive government use of surveillance technologies (Bauer and Bromley 2016;
Bohnenberger 2017; cf. also Amnesty International 2014; Human Rights Watch
2014). As argued by McKune and Deibert (2017), such technologies together with
the briefly elaborated international background make it understandable why and
how offensive cyber security technologies initially entered to the WA’s realm:
when policy makers approached cyber security by thinking about cyber weapons,
the next logical step was to think also in terms of export controls for arms, weapons,
and munitions.
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Figure 1: The Australia Group Members (years of joining, as of 2019)
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6However, there are a couple of important points that further shed light on the
export controls for cyber security technologies. The first point relates to a state-
centric international relations viewpoint, which tends to conceal the long history
of cyber security export controls and their relation to national politics. This point
is particularly important for understanding the later 2015 proposal for implement-
ing the WA in the United States. The second point stems from the discretion prin-
ciple: the ideal of comprehensiveness provides a rationale for cataloging new se-
curity technologies, while voluntarism often makes it politically easy to add such
technologies to the WA. Both points require a brief elaboration.
2.2 Historical Genesis
The international background can be used for illustrating a few key differences be-
tween Wassenaar and other comparable multilateral transfer control treaties and
coordination bodies. When compared to the COCOM, Wassenaar was from the
beginning more heterogeneous, covering more states than the seventeen that had
participated in the COCOM with its explicitly stated historical goal of preventing
weapon exports to the Soviet block and China. The composition is an important
characteristic also today. Given the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, it is
worthwhile to note that both Russia and Ukraine are participating in the Wasse-
naar Arrangement (see Fig. 2). If nothing else, this case exemplifies the commonly
expressed criticism that the heterogeneous composition may hamper bargaining
and consensus-building among the participating states (Beck, 2000; Bromley et al.,
2012).5 Yet, as Craft and Grillot (1999) point out, already during the initiation,
Wassenaar differed significantly from the COCOM not only in terms of the (a) het-
erogeneous composition of the state members, but also with respect to (b) the lack
of explicitly stated targets, (c) the expansion of coverage to conventional weapons,
(d) and the omission of a mechanism for multilateral oversight. The last two items
are particularly relevant to the current cyber security debate.
The phrasing about lacking of multilateral oversight means that Wassenaar is
built on national discretion; unlike with the historical COCOM, there are no for-
mal reviews or veto points that the member states could use prior to a weapons
transfer by another member state (Craft and Grillot, 1999; The Wassenaar Ar-
rangement, 1996). This Western-initiated historical genesis – with its cartel-like
constraints for the supply-side characteristics – has also been met with skepticism
in countries such as China, which has historically been reluctant to join to the WA,
MTCR, and Australia Group (Yuan, 2002). Among the traditional Western allies
of the U.S., on the other hand, the genesis has largely blended to national and
regional legislations.
Although the EU has went slightly further in the coverage and enforcement
among its member states, the regulations, including the core dual-use Council
Regulation 428/2009 (European Commission, 2009), are strongly tied to the mul-
tilateral arrangements, including the NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, Wassenaar,
and the UN treaties and resolutions (Atlas, 2008; Bohm et al., 1999; Micara, 2012;
von der Dunk, 2009). To summarize: the COCOM and Wassenaar provided histor-
ical templates for constructing other multilateral venues (Shaw, 2016), while the
U.S. export control tradition was often seen as a historical “gold standard” against
7which many of these venues were framed (Erickson, 2015; Waltz, 2007). The em-
phasis placed on discretion and commercial bona fide transactions have been the
central keywords in this transatlantic regime (Bohm et al. 1999; see also Diffie and
Landau 2007; von der Dunk 2009). The generally liberal position (Winkel, 2003) on
the controls for commercial weapons transfers together with the discretion princi-
ple make it understandable why this multi-treaty regime has often been used for
both foreign and trade policies. Cyber security is no exception.
This genesis should be kept in mind before proceeding to the cyber security
domain. In fact, within this domain in particular, the historical narrative reads
pronouncedly as a story of the national U.S. export control system. However, it
should be also understood that, in reality, the U.S. has not had a single unified
system, policy, or strategy toward export controls after the Cold War.
The occasional inconsistency and ambivalence have largely originated from
national U.S. politics (Erickson, 2015; Waltz, 2007). In the cyber security context, a
basic political dividing line in the U.S. has historically manifested itself between
trade promoters and nonproliferation advocates, although, in general, the U.S. cy-
ber security politics and lobbying traits include numerous different institutions,
companies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).6 Among the notable
U.S. export control institutions are the Department of State and the Department
of Commerce, the latter having traditionally been the main institution responsible
for questions related to dual-use weapons (Burke, 2012; Diffie and Landau, 2007;
Rajeswari, 1998; Seyoum, 2017; von der Dunk, 2009). The former has traditionally
concentrated on military technology, national security, and foreign policy together
with institutions such as the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice,
and illustratively for underlining the policy complexity, even the Departments
of Treasury and Energy (Evans and Valdivia, 2012; Rajeswari, 1998; Rowold and
Ponting, 2015; Seyoum, 2017; Waltz, 2007).7 Nevertheless, occasionally the fine
balance between trade and security has been adjusted by concretely shifting ex-
port control responsibilities between the Departments of Commerce and State,
respectively (Thomsen II and Paytas, 2001). Against this backdrop, it was perhaps
a small surprise that the current debate originated from a proposal made not via
cyber security institutions but through the Department of Commerce. Before pro-
ceeding to the current debate, a brief discussion is required beforehand regarding
historical export controls placed over cryptography.
2.3 Cryptographic Legacy
The early history of cyber security export controls unfolds largely as a history
of export controls placed by the U.S. for cryptography. For a good part of the
20th century, the globally relevant export controls for cryptography were placed
by the U.S. with a dual rationale that balanced foreign policy with trade policy
(Diffie and Landau, 2007).8 After the 1990s “crypto wars” (Buchanan, 2016b; Lan-
dau, 2014; Winkel, 2003), these controls for cryptography were largely and in-
crementally liberalized during the late 1990s and early 2000s within the transat-
lantic block. According to Diffie and Landau (2007), in the long haul, the policy
change in the U.S. was a result from a number of large transformations; the end
of the bipolar world order, the rise of ICT and the associated demand for high-
8technology dual-use components, the simultaneous deregulation of the financial
and ICT sectors among the Western states, the ever continuing globalization, and
a number of related major historical trends. All in all, it was increasingly difficult
to control the volatility of cyber security technologies, including but not limited
to cryptography.
For a short while, it seemed that the old Cold War era regulations would pre-
vail for cryptography. The WA was amended in 1998 to cover “strong” encryption
(as measured by a key length of a cipher), albeit shorter keys were framed to out-
side of the WA’s scope by a request from the U.S. and its ICT sector (Dean, 1999;
Diffie and Landau, 2007). Paved by the scientific evidence in favor of the insecu-
rity of many weak cryptographic algorithms – among other things – the efforts
of the Clinton administration failed at both domestic and international venues
(Buchanan, 2016a; Dean, 1999; Thomsen II and Paytas, 2001). Soon after these
failed attempts, the historical policy regime for cryptography was in practice ter-
minated by the European Union in 2000 with its abolition of the cryptographic
export controls within the union – a decision that was later adopted also by the
Clinton administration vis-a´-vis the fifteen EU members together with a number
of other Western countries (Diffie and Landau, 2007; McGlone and Burton, 2000;
Thomsen II and Paytas, 2001). Although some regulations over exports of cryp-
tography are still in place in the U.S., a more recent trend seems to include fur-
ther relaxation and small amendments rather than a push toward tighter controls
(Bartlett III et al., 2008; Landau, 2014). For the controlled cryptography exports,
different licensing choices are available to countries outside of the WA. Similar
deregulation occurred also in other ICT subdomains.
At the same time, this liberalization has gone hand in hand with the expan-
sion of multilaterally covered items. In other words, there has been a parallel
trend for covering more and more technology items as the participating states
have attempted to keep up with the pace of technological change. This dual trend
of expansion and relaxation applies also to the multilateral case at hand: the WA’s
plenaries from the early 2000s to 2015 tend to emphasize both relaxation and ex-
pansion (see The Wassenaar Arrangement, 2000, 2002, 2015, for instance). The lat-
ter is understandable against the noted rationale of achieving efficiency through
comprehensiveness and diligence. Finally, it should be emphasized that the his-
torical crypto wars also left behind an energetic tradition of active NGO involve-
ment, driven by cyber security professionals, lawyers, academics, open source
advocates, and hobbyists alike.9
3 The Wassenaar Debate
The discretion principle, the balance between security and commerce, and the
crypto wars are all helpful for better understanding the 2010s Wassenaar debate.
However, these are not enough; cyber security cannot be fully understood without
understanding technology. Thus, in what follows, a brief technical overview is
carried out before revisiting the more recent political developments.
93.1 Software Restrictions
Analogously to the Australia Group, which maintains a comprehensive list of tox-
ics as well as human, animal, and plant pathogens (Atlas, 2008), Wassenaar cur-
rently includes nine categories with meticulously collected but still vaguely de-
fined items. On the side of computer hardware, which occupies the categories
of computers and electronics, the list includes everything from microprocessor
microcircuits and microcomputer microcircuits to analogue-to-digital converters,
static random-access memories, field programmable logic devices, and circuits de-
signed for signal processing, not forgetting “custom integrated circuits for which
either the function is unknown or the status of the equipment in which the in-
tegrated circuit will be used is unknown” (The Wassenaar Arrangement, 2018,
p. 50). Although many of the items are listed with specific operational ranges, the
definitions are still encompassing and imprecise. In general, this vagueness re-
flects the increasing problems with the concept of dual-use technologies (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2018; Rath et al., 2014; Rajeswari, 1998; Williams-Jones et al., 2014).
Thus, to see the forest from the trees, it is better to again focus on the historical
changes and amendments, augmented by the fundamental framings and exclu-
sion criteria used in the Wassenaar Arrangement.
The current list starts with an important reservation about software that is not
covered. This exclusion provision is threefold. To quote from the current list (The
Wassenaar Arrangement, 2018, p. 3), the WA does not cover items that fall to the
following categories:
1. Software either (a) available to the public via commercial (1) “over-the-count-
er”, (2) “mail order”, (3) “electronic”, or (4) “telephony call” transactions
with “retail selling points”, or (b) which is designed “for installation by the
user without further substantial support by the supplier”.
2. Software that is “‘in the public domain’; or”
3. Software implementations related to otherwise authorized exports in case
these involve object (that is, binary) code needed for “the installation, oper-
ation, maintenance (checking) or repair”.
The first provision essentially excludes the commercial software industry. The
emphasis on the four different transfer channels reflects the 2001 agreement that
transfers should be permitted for intangible technology items, including software,
regardless of the means by which a transfer takes place (The Wassenaar Arrange-
ment, 2001). Moreover, the exclusion of open source is effectively made explicit in
the second exclusion criterion through a familiar public domain loophole (Beck,
2000; Burke, 2012). The third clause is also important: this exclusion criterion es-
sentially means that the controls do not apply to software updates, including se-
curity patches to known and publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. Though, the third
category leaves it unclear (i) whether the exclusion applies only to binary updates,
which is not necessary the case with open source software and transactions related
to vulnerability information. It is also unclear (ii) whether software for vulnerabil-
ity and exploitation scanning could be classified as being necessary for software
maintenance, checking, or “repair”. Likewise, (iii) it seems fair to say that most
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(but not necessarily all) vulnerabilities and exploits are disclosed and published
as-is – without any particular “support by the supplier”. Consequently, also vul-
nerabilities and exploits could be interpreted as excludable – insofar as these are
understood as abstract software defects with security implications and concrete
software implementations to exploit these defects, respectively, especially when
these are published under the public domain principle.
However, importantly, the first clause and the third clause both carry a remark
that any software related to information security is not applicable (The Wasse-
naar Arrangement, 2018, p. 3). Through this loophole, in principle, any software
security artifact can be potentially covered in the WA via relaxing the definition
of software with respect to information security.
3.2 Surveillance Items
Information security is placed in the WA as a second subcategory of computers,
to accompany the other subcategory of telecommunications. The latter covers
anything from underwater equipment, acoustic carriers, explosion devices, and
jamming equipment to conventional Internet Protocol (IP) networking. The last
item is also relatively new. The WA’s expansion toward IP-based networking oc-
curred between 2012 and 2013, and this expansion was also rapidly adopted to the
EU regulations (Bauer and Bromley, 2016; Bohnenberger, 2017; The Wassenaar Ar-
rangement, 2012). For the present purposes, particularly noteworthy are the cov-
ered IP-based technologies, which include “surveillance systems or equipment”
that satisfy all of the following conditions (direct quotations from The Wasse-
naar Arrangement, 2018, p. 87):
1. Communication technology performing the following three functions on a
“carrier class IP network”: (a) “analysis at the application layer”; (b) “ex-
traction of selected metadata and application content”; and (c) “indexing of
extracted data”.
2. Communication technology that is designed to perform the following two
functions: (a) data extraction according to “hard selectors”; and (b) “map-
ping of the relational network of an individual or of a group of people”.
To disseminate the list, the function (a) in the first clause refers to communi-
cation technology designed for the so-called deep packet inspection operating at
the seventh layer in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. The function
(b) clarifies that only systems that harvest specific applications (related to, say, the
domain name system, the hypertext transfer protocol powering the current Web,
or the protocols governing electronic mail) are covered. Finally, the indexing func-
tion (c) might be interpreted to restrict the scope to systems that utilize a database,
although the intention remains generally unclear for this particular clause.
Thus far, in theory, the preceding list covers numerous network security prod-
ucts related to intrusion detection and prevention, whether commercial or open
source, as well as the academic research domain related to the use of machine
learning for such products. However, there is an important restriction present al-
ready in the first clause: the term “carrier class IP network” is used to refer to
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“national grade IP backbone”, which effectively rules out conventional (layer-7)
detection and prevention systems designed to guard smaller networks, including
local area networks. The second clause continues the same theme, further framing
the covered systems to those involved in harvesting “hard selectors” that identify
individuals or groups via their real names, electronic mail addresses, phone num-
bers, group affiliations, or street addresses. (The Wassenaar Arrangement, 2018,
p. 87.) This emphasis is understandable due to the increasing importance of meta-
data for security intelligence and surveillance technologies (Landau, 2016). More-
over, the first clause contains a note that excludes systems specifically designed
for network quality of service or marketing purposes (The Wassenaar Arrange-
ment, 2018, p. 87). Insofar as common cyber attacks such as denial of service (or
tools thereto) are interpreted to always involve network quality of service charac-
teristics, this note is somewhat ambiguous, however.
All in all, the expansion toward IP-based surveillance systems can be seen to
target deep packet inspection technologies that are designed to operate at a na-
tionwide level. Due to the provisions outlined, the scope is relatively narrow
(Bohnenberger, 2017). The clear intention is to cover those technologies used for
so-called mass surveillance.
However, the subcategory of information security is largely still reserved for
cryptography. In fact, cryptography is used to frame all items that fall to the cat-
egories of “non-cryptographic information security”, “defeating, weakening or
bypassing information security”, “test, inspection and production equipment” re-
lated to security, and information security software (The Wassenaar Arrangement,
2018, pp. 97–98). Although the wording about defeating, weakening, and bypass-
ing is alarming in terms of research and common security tools, the origins of the
current debate are located not in the telecommunications items and surveillance
technologies, but in a seemingly simple but far-reaching adjustment made to the
definition of software within the computer category in the Wassenaar Arrangement.
3.3 Intrusion Software
The origins in the current debate trace back to the 2013 expansion of covered items
with software “specially designed or modified to avoid detection by ’monitor-
ing tools’, or to defeat ’protective countermeasures’, of a computer or network-
capable device” (The Wassenaar Arrangement, 2018, p. 221). In the current item
list, intrusion software is clarified to contain software implementations perform-
ing any of the functions enumerated in the following two clauses (as previously,
direct quotations from The Wassenaar Arrangement, 2018, p. 221):
1. “The extraction of data or information, from a computer or network-capable
device, or the modification of system or user data; or”
2. “The modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in
order to allow the execution of externally provided instructions”.
An enforcement of these two cases would apply to large portions of security in-
dustry and computer science. Both clauses are all-embracing, covering in practice
anything from intrusion detection software to automatic vulnerability scanners,
12
including fuzzing and other types of runtime memory analysis. The wording in
the first clause contains some hints that the attempt might be to emphasize the
integrity aspects of cyber security, but the wording about system modifications is
still too imprecise for making definite conclusions. The first clause may also con-
flict with the noted exclusion criterion for software updates. Further examples are
not difficult to pinpoint; the first clause leaves it unclear whether the research and
practice of computer and network forensics is potentially covered, for instance.
The same ambiguity applies to the second clause, which may cover various
debugging tools commonly used in software development. Implicitly, the clause
seems to refer to exploits for common software vulnerabilities such as buffer over-
flows. If the intention was to include all exploits, on the other hand, the definition
is not comprehensive enough. That is to say, the exploitation of many vulnerabil-
ities does not require the execution of externally provided instructions – actually,
the arrival rate of such vulnerabilities has probably decreased over the years, ow-
ing to mitigative solutions, the use of memory-safe programming languages, and
the ever increasing amount of different web vulnerabilities. Finally, many com-
mon software vulnerabilities are plain logical defects, which makes it practically
impossible to define the concept of externally provided instructions.10
The list of covered security items does not stop here. In fact, protective coun-
termeasures are specifically noted to include data execution prevention, address
space layout randomization (ASLR), and sandboxing. Because technologies such
as ASLR had been available in most operating systems by 2013, it is thus clear
that the amendment targeted also more sophisticated exploitation techniques via
which ASLR might be countered. The same applies to sandboxing, which is used
in many current web browsers, for instance. Analogously, the WA specifically
lists antivirus (AV), endpoint, and personal security products, as well as intrusion
detection systems (IDS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS), and firewalls as mon-
itoring tools. (The Wassenaar Arrangement, 2018, p. 222.) Paradoxically, many of
these monitoring tools also fall to the domain of the first clause; a firewall extracts
data from a network, an AV product from a computer, and so forth.
Interestingly, loopholes were still reserved for some industries and technolo-
gies. In particular, the definition of intrusion software does not apply to the fol-
lowing three groups of software (The Wassenaar Arrangement, 2018, p. 222):
1. Debuggers, virtualization hypervisors, or software reverse engineering tools;
2. Software implementations for digital rights management (DRM);
3. Software that is installed by manufacturers, administrators, or end-users for
“the purposes of asset tracking or recovery”.
It thus seems that virtualization technologies might be excluded via the spe-
cific hypervisor exception. Debugging and reverse engineering seem to be also
exempted, despite of the earlier clauses over the modification of the execution of
a software program and the data extraction from computers and networks. Of
course, DRM software was also excluded, which, if nothing else, signals that at
least not all of the commercial voices were ignored during drafting of the amend-
ment.
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Figure 3: The Fuzzy Analytical Meaning of Intrusion Software During the 2010s Wasse-
naar Debate (inferred from The Department of Commerce 2015 and The Wassenaar Ar-
rangement 2018)
For summarizing the key observations and ambiguities, an analytical concep-
tual model is presented in Fig. 3 for the key terms related to intrusion software.
In essence, the blurry definition of intrusion software underlines modification of
data and systems, defeating protective countermeasures commonly used in defen-
sive security, and monitoring of computers and networks. Implicitly, these char-
acteristics relate to regulation of software vulnerabilities and exploits – as well
as surveillance technologies. The apparent inconsistencies in the figure allow to
also understand how minor terminological changes can have major implications
in export control regimes (cf. Rath et al., 2014). A minor terminological alteration
prompted also the current, still ongoing Wassenaar debate.
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3.4 Later Developments
The 2013 amendment to the WA did not alter the fundamental discretion princi-
ple. Even though the multilateral amendment itself generated only limited media
attention, the uproar started in May 2015 when the U.S. Department of Commerce
announced its proposal for implementing the elaborated surveillance and intru-
sion items. The proposal essentially altered the definition for intrusion software
with a seemingly simple clarification. “Systems, equipment, components and soft-
ware specially designed for the generation, operation or delivery of, or commu-
nication with” was interpreted to include “network penetration testing products
that use intrusion software to identify vulnerabilities of computers and network-
capable devices” (The Department of Commerce, 2015). This clarification pushed
the industry context explicitly toward the vulnerability markets and the offensive
security industry segment.
Soon after, Martin (2015), a spokesperson from Google, commented that the
rules were dangerously broad and vague, potentially causing an extensive finan-
cial licensing burden for companies that orchestrate vulnerability finding cam-
paigns for improving the security of their products. On the NGO side, the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which had activated already during the mid-
1990s crypto wars (Kennedy, 2000), was also quick to respond, submitting also
comments for the Department’s request of comments. In addition to the economic
arguments, EFF expectedly emphasized the relation to computer science and se-
curity research. In particular, EFF lifted (Cardozo and Galperin, 2015) the addi-
tional definition that the “technology for the development of intrusion software
includes proprietary research on the vulnerabilities and exploitation of comput-
ers and network-capable devices” (The Department of Commerce, 2015). Given
the keyword of proprietary research, it is hardly a surprise that fierce criticism was
expressed particularly in the offensive security industry segment.
By July 2015, Synack, FireEye, and other companies in the segment had formed
a coalition to oppose the proposed implementation, criticizing the ambiguity, the
lack of attention given for the interests of U.S. companies, and the negative im-
pacts on global research and development. Regardless whether the change was a
result from the opposition, or whether the proposal was intentionally published
by the Department of Commerce as a hurried request of comments, the proposal
was withdrawn later during the same month. The intense lobbying that followed
made the U.S. to reverse its position on the earlier WA amendments.11 In fact,
the U.S. representatives renegotiated the 2013 amendments at the December 2016
Wassenaar plenary session. To some extent, the renegotiation was successful: the
current item list explicitly excludes vulnerability disclosure and (cyber) incident
response (The Wassenaar Arrangement, 2018, p. 80). While vulnerability disclo-
sure, incident response, and associated factors were also the primary concerns of
many industry stakeholders, the current exemption is again largely a line in the
sand: depending on the interpretation and circumstances, vulnerabilities and ex-
ploits may be exempted or these may satisfy the definition given for intrusion
software. Although the U.S. sought to eliminate the concept of intrusion software
altogether (Lichtenbaum et al., 2018), the concept still appears in the current item
list. At the time of writing, it also seems likely that the concept will remain firmly
as an item covered in the Wassenaar Arrangement.
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4 Discussion
This paper reviewed the 2010s debate on augmenting the Wassenaar Arrangement
to cover cyber weapons. The elaborated discretion principle and the history of
cryptography export controls together with the brief technical overview help at
digesting the numerous different points raised during the debate. In addition to
summarizing the key observations, the discussion that follows enumerates a few
tentative policy recommendations.
In some respects, the current debate resonates with the 1990s debates on ex-
port controls for cryptography. During that time, there was an increased aware-
ness among policy makers for regulating cryptography via export controls, which
was accompanied by intense lobbying and widespread confusion on how the ac-
tual regulation should work. In both cases, state institutions seem to have failed
in attracting professionals and volunteers with sufficient domain knowledge for
participating in policy drafting (cf. Beck, 2000; Dean, 1999). In this area con-
crete improvements might be also relatively easy to achieve. In other words, it
is easy to agree with a commonly voiced (e.g., Bauer and Bromley, 2016; Human
Rights Watch, 2014; Shaw, 2016) policy recommendation (PR) that can be stated
as follows:
PR1 Encourage active participation of diverse stakeholders in the policy making
of cyber security export controls.
When compared to export controls for conventional arms and weapons, the
current debate and the historical crypto wars are also relatively unique in the
sense that NGOs such as EFF and the supply-side industry have mostly joined
forces to oppose state initiatives particularly in the United States. When com-
pared to the crypto wars, the historical context is different, however. In addition
to the substantially increased importance of cyber security, the present attempts
occurred after a relatively long period of relaxed controls, owing to the deregula-
tion that was implemented in the aftermaths of the crypto wars, which, in turn,
were fought under a historical legacy of tight export controls. There are also ad-
ditional reasons why the historical questions related to cryptography are relevant
for framing the still ongoing Wassenaar debate.
It is interesting to observe that human rights activists have almost universally
promoted the unrestricted use of cryptography and the free exchange of strong
encryption technologies. This enduring consensus largely originates from the
crypto wars. In contrast, there has been some polarization among the viewpoints
of NGOs during the Wassenaar debate. While the position of EFF has aligned
with those held in the cyber security industry, other NGOs have promoted the es-
tablishment of export controls for offensive cyber weapons. In particular, human
rights groups had a strong influence over the 2013 inclusion of intrusion software
to the Wassenaar Arrangement (Bauer and Bromley, 2016; Bohnenberger, 2017;
Burkart and McCourt, 2017). This polarization reflects a wider crack. Because
the concept of intrusion software was included verbatim in the 2018 amendment
to the EU regulations (European Commission, 2018), while the analogous imple-
mentation attempts seem to have stalled in the U.S. (Lichtenbaum et al., 2018), it
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seems that the approaches to cyber security regulation continue to diverge among
Western states also in terms of export controls.12 Analogous trends are seen in
other cyber security domains, including but not limited to privacy and data pro-
tection. It remains interesting to see whether and to which extent these diverging
trends will impact multilateralism in general.
The historical controls for exports of cryptography balanced security concerns
with economic interests. Although the voice of the cyber security industry even-
tually reached the right target, the 2015 proposal of the U.S. Department of Com-
merce still marked an abrupt albeit temporary change in the continuum between
security and trade. Because exporting companies need to devote substantial amount
of time and resources to study changes in export control policies, preemptive pol-
icy changes are generally preferable (Seyoum, 2017). Changes to export control
policies should not come out from the blue sky to industry stakeholders. Thus, it
is important underline the adjective diverse used in PR1. In other words, also in-
dustry stakeholders should be encouraged to participate in the drafting of cyber
security export control policies.
It is important to emphasize that despite of some NGO-driven surveys and
academic studies (Burkart and McCourt, 2017; McKune and Deibert, 2017; Ruo-
honen et al., 2016b; Wilson, 2013), the existing knowledge about the offensive cy-
ber security segment remains extremely limited for stakeholder-accommodating
but still evidence-based policy making. It is also unlikely that the situation will
improve without industry participation. Therefore, also other means should be
considered to motivate voluntary industry participation. As alternatives to regu-
lation, incentives could be created for promoting good corporate governance prac-
tices, ethical codes of conduct (Dunn Cavelty, 2014; Williams-Jones et al., 2014),
and the establishment of industry consortia in order to improve transparency and
accountability. These are examples that could accommodate also some of the hu-
man rights concerns. Without neither referring to any particular policy technique
nor answering to critics (Parsons, 2017), these softer (non-regulatory) aspects are
implicitly embedded to the policy recommendation PR2:
PR2 Improve outreach to the cyber security industry.
The heritage from the crypto wars can be portrayed also through an institu-
tional viewpoint to export controls. In this regard, the Wassenaar debate reflects
the long-standing institutional issues between different U.S. state departments
and bureaus for handling export controls. Comparable problems are seen also
in Europe. In essence, the continuing departmental infighting and related insti-
tutional conflicts in the United States (Seyoum, 2017; Waltz, 2007) manifest them-
selves within the EU through cross-country harmonization and enforcement prob-
lems (Micara, 2012; von der Dunk, 2009). Reflecting the commonly voiced urge to
have central clearinghouses (Burke, 2012; Burkart and McCourt, 2017; Seyoum,
2017), the following policy recommendation seems generally justified:
PR3 Improve centralized governance of cyber security export controls.
Cryptography cannot be fully understood without deep scientific knowledge.
In contrast to mathematics and algorithms, the discussion about cyber weapons
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continues to revolve around vague abstractions that cause numerous ambiguities.
In this respect, the language used in the WA and related policy documents fore-
tell about limited participation of relevant stakeholders. Indeed, like with many
related cyber security questions (Bellovin et al., 2016), the vetting of the amend-
ments was limited among cyber security professionals and computer scientists.
Despite of some improvements, particularly the engagement with academia re-
mains generally limited (Bauer and Bromley, 2016; Evans and Valdivia, 2012),
which further reinforces the importance of diverse stakeholder participation (PR1).
Wider participation implies slower policy making, which may be also beneficial in
the cyber security domain. The sequence of events in the Wassenaar debate indi-
cate that the amendments and proposals were likely made too hastily.13 Because
changes once made to multilateral export control systems are difficult to revert or
otherwise alter, care should be taken with further amendments, as summarized in
the policy recommendation PR4:
PR4 Balance comprehensiveness with diligence in each and every amendment.
There are three additional points worth making about terminology. As was
demonstrated in Section 3, even a cursory technical outlook still reveals many
unclear and contradictory issues. These problems prompt the first practical point:
because offensive security tools and techniques are imposed by regulations placed
over payment card industry (Knowles et al., 2016), for instance, the ambiguity
issues may lead to legal conflicts and other problems for a national enforcement
of the WA. This is the main message from the 2015 fiasco in the United States.
The second point is more theoretical: due to the vagueness, it is difficult to infer
about the actual intention of policy makers from the export control policy docu-
ments. To make the point more translucent, it is illuminating to briefly return to
Fig. 3. From a technical perspective, there are numerous questions related to the
edges (relations) between the vertices (concepts) shown in the figure. In many re-
spects, it would make sense to redraw the figure as a maximally connected graph
by connecting all of the rectangles together. Is fuzzing reverse engineering? Is as-
set tracking part of monitoring? How about surveillance? Such questions are im-
portant to ask because imprecise terminology poses a risk of escalation; legitimate
attempts to control exports of state-led surveillance technologies may spill over to
industry and civil society.14 Fortunately, it is not necessarily difficult to prevent
such an escalation. While keeping in mind that precise language often falls on
deaf ears due to bargaining and other political reasons affecting export controls
(Ga¨rtner, 2010; Hansen, 2016), addressing the following policy recommendation
(PR5) would offer a good start for concrete improvements:
PR5 Rely on established terminology used in the cyber security industry and
computer science.
This recommendation can be accompanied with a corollary.15 The Wasse-
naar debate supports the arguments that the concept of dual-use has already
long ago lost most of its analytical power (Burkart and McCourt, 2017; Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2018; Rath et al., 2014; Rajeswari, 1998; Williams-Jones et al., 2014).
If it is admitted that cyber security differs from conventional security, it is also
logical to make a subsequent policy recommendation:
PR6 Review the concept of dual-use in the context of cyber security.
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Without addressing the recommendation PR6, there is a continuous danger
that more and more cyber security technologies will be moved to the other end-
point in the civilian-military continuum. The consequences are unforeseeable, but
there are still many good reasons to assert that such changes would have a deteri-
orating effect upon security in the Internet.
The third and final point about terminology is speculative. To some extent,
it seems that the language used in the export control policy documents is inten-
tionally used for trying to conceal the elephant in the room; the connection of
export controls to government hacking and state-led offensive security in gen-
eral. By using the obscure term intrusion software, states can conveniently avoid
mentioning many inconvenient cyber security questions. These questions include
legislations about planting malware to citizens’ computers (Bellovin et al., 2016),
requiring private sector ICT companies to hand over sensitive data, the potential
of inserting “golden keys” to cryptographic algorithms (Buchanan, 2016a), the in-
tentional introduction of vulnerabilities, and, of course, the suspected heavy use
of the offensive cyber security industry segment for purchasing vulnerabilities
and exploits (Burkart and McCourt, 2017; Deibert, 2015; Jardine, 2015; Kuehn and
Mueller, 2014). If anything, the fundamental lesson learned from the crypto wars
was that restricting technology and holding secrets make the whole Internet a less
secure place, irrespective whether the restrictions or secrets refer to weaknesses in
cryptographic algorithms or to undisclosed software vulnerabilities.
The fundamental problem for academic research is that most allegations of
government hacking remain speculations that are better done by journalists, cy-
ber security companies, NGOs, and related parties. The point applies also to the
Wassenaar debate. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Syria are not par-
ticipating in the Wassenaar Arrangement (see Fig. 2), but it is extremely difficult to
establish a robust link between government hacking and related exports to such
countries. For these reasons, there is no other option but to resort to the final
policy recommendation PR7:
PR7 Improve government transparency in the cyber security domain.
The reverse direction should be also considered; there are no exports without
imports. Because countries such as China and Israel remain outside of the inter-
national regulation regime, it remains unclear how effective the export controls
for cyber weapons are due to imports from outside of the regime. There is also
a risk that non-state actors may be able to import surveillance technologies and
knowledge thereto. After all: there are already plenty of alarming examples about
leakages of cyber weapons from various state actors.
The points raised can be used to briefly reflect the bigger issues working un-
derneath the ongoing debate about export controls for cyber weapons. Cyber se-
curity is often framed with different polar opposites, such as external and internal,
military and civilian, or public and private (Ruohonen et al., 2016a). The Wasse-
naar debate acts as a good reminder that there are also many other fundamental
dimensions. As was elaborated, exports controls in general align well with the
nexus between trade and security. This nexus is not the only one, however. Fram-
ing can be done also in terms of conflicting interests between states and industry,
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between states and civil societies, between national and societal security (Mueller,
2017), or between industry and human rights. It is possible to go even further.
As Schneier (2019) has been arguing, one fundamental question is about whether
the future is built around security or surveillance; either “everyone gets to spy,
or no one gets to spy”. When portrayed through the Wassenaar Arrangement,
it seems fair to maintain the sensibility of his point: it indeed seems improbable
that the arrangement can prevent the proliferation of surveillance technologies
and intrusion software, whatever the exact definitions for these are. This tentative
prediction echoes the historical voices from the crypto wars.
When the nexus is set between security and surveillance, the Internet and its
governance are necessarily also a part of the picture. In this regard, the final an-
alytical dimension can be set according to Mueller’s (2010) classical framing be-
tween networked multistakeholder and state-centric governance models. Multi-
lateral export controls set by states against other states are a prima facie example of
the latter. Although vulnerability disclosure and incident response are currently
exempted from the WA’s coverage, the 2010s debate and the arrangement’s en-
forcement particularly in the EU indicate another small swing in the pendulum
toward state-centric governance. A drop in the ocean, perhaps, but from small
streams becomes a river.
Notes
1 For the purposes of this paper, the concept of cyber weapons is deliberately left undefined (for a theoretical
discussion about the concept see Bellovin et al. 2017 and Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018).
2 This kind of voluntarism has also remained Wassenaar’s central problem (Ga¨rtner, 2010). In the contemporary
global world, an export to Middle East might be denied for a supplier in the U.S., although a transfer might be
possible via a subsidiary in another country, to paraphrase Beck’s (2000) example. Exporters’ failures to comply are
relatively common (Burke, 2012). Inadequate comprehensiveness and lack of diligence have frequently also opened
different loopholes through which shadow exports are still possible despite of placed controls (Waltz, 2007). The ICT
sector is supposedly particularly problematic in this regard.
3 This threefold terminological setup is not comprehensive, but it still allows framing the scope of the paper as
well as the current debate. Importantly, the restriction to these three concepts deliberately bypasses arguably more
fundamental concepts related to threats, risks, and likelihoods. Nor is the attempt to place the case at hand into
analytical cages such as the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) triad.
4 Here, offensive security is used to analytically distinguish practices and technologies that are distinct to those
used in the more traditional defensive security segment, including conventional anti-virus software companies (Ruo-
honen et al., 2016b). This definition is deliberately restricted to the industry (for a more encompassing discussion
see Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018 and Slayton 2016). Analogously to the duality between vulnerabilities and exploits –
often, demonstrating the existence of the former mandates the engineering of the latter, the (defensive) technologies
within the sector often utilize offensive techniques for defensive purposes. The so-called penetration testing (Knowles
et al., 2016) is the prime example in this regard. Furthermore, it can be noted that the term zero-day vulnerability
refers to a vulnerability that has been discovered, whether by a benign actor or a criminal, but not made known (that
is, disclosed) to the affected vendor, its users, and the public.
5 Moreover, the current composition makes it possible to question whether terms such as Western or transatlantic
are misleading for characterizing the case. While keeping this terminology remark in mind, in this paper, when used,
these terms refer to the long historical genesis rather than to the geographic composition.
6 By and large, this dividing line can be argued to apply also to Europe within which the public outcries for
tighter controls have often met the commercial rationale of creating a level playing field for the European defense
and security industries (Bauer and Bromley, 2016; Hansen, 2016). In terms of the 2010s debate, however, the voice of
the industry is largely a global one rather carrying a particular geographic tone.
7 This kind of large institutional variety is not limited to bureaucratic administrative institutions (that is, the policy
complexity extends to parliamentary institutions). Nor is it specific to the United States. In general, poor coordination
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between institutions may also contribute to problems in rigorous enforcement, alongside other inefficiencies in export
controls (Seyoum, 2017; Yuan, 2002).
8 A number of historical examples could be used for illustrating this rationale. It was present when in 2008 when
President Bush announced to reform dual-use export control policies (Bartlett III et al., 2008), to give a relatively recent
example. To give another, more distant example: in the long historical picture, the rationale was visible already with
the U.S. reluctance for engagement in the early multilateral efforts, as exemplified by the late 1935 ratification of the
(1925) Geneva Arms Traffic Convention (Erickson, 2015). To some extent, both examples could be used as evidence
for framing even the whole history of modern export controls against the dual rationale.
9 Although some scholars have interpreted the EU response as having resulted from opaque U.S. policies for
cryptography (Winkel, 2003), it is worthwhile to emphasize this NGO-side, including the role of academia. Indeed,
perhaps the most famous legal case during the crypto wars was initiated by computer scientist Daniel J. Bernstein
– a case that can be interpreted as having signaled the fundamental turn of tide (Kennedy, 2000; McGlone and Bur-
ton, 2000; Thomsen II and Paytas, 2001). Analogously, emergence of the open source phenomenon accelerated the
relaxation (Diffie and Landau, 2007). Although the paper is framed against multilateral controls (policies), which are
imposed by states against other states, it should be thus emphasized that export control politics cannot be understood
with a state-centric viewpoint alone.
10 A simple example would be a structured query language injection; what separates commands externally injected
to execution from other commands externally inserted to execution?
11 This change allows to also make a small historical parallel to the ATT negotiations during which the U.S. also
eventually reversed its position (see Bromley et al., 2012; Erickson, 2015). Another reversal occurred in April 2019
when the Trump administration announced a withdrawal from the ATT to which the U.S. had joined (without ratifi-
cation) in 2013 during the Obama administration.
12 It can be remarked that the mid-2010s events in the EU largely followed a similar path, although the analogous
European lobbying efforts were not as successful as in the United States. In the late-2010s, however, there were also
some cracks within the EU. Although the attempts were unsuccessful, some member states (notably, Finland, Swe-
den, and the United Kingdom) opposed the EU-level enforcement by arguing that regulation should occur primarily
through the WA and its national implementations (Moßbrucker, 2018).
13 As noted by Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2018), the speed at which multilateral agreements and conventions are ne-
gotiated has been a common issue also in the cyber security domain. The same point extends to the right timing to
conduct such negotiations in the face of other events in world politics. In other words, it may be that mid-2010s was
not the optimal time to alter the WA.
14 It is not difficult to ask even trickier questions. By recalling the definitions from Section 3, consider the following
imaginary question as an example: is the use of the nmap tool (cf. Lyon, 2009) part of monitoring or (and) defeating of
countermeasures, such as firewalls, when conducted in, say, virtualized environments for penetration testing of an open
source software updating solution deployed for a particular hypervisor running in a cloud?
15 Also Herr and Rosenzweig (2016) raise the same point about PR5. It is worth further remarking that a robust
way to improve the terminology would be to attach the concepts to standards, but the problem is that particularly
offensive cyber security tools and techniques seldom have clear technical reference points.
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